AI security

Control what your AI can do.

We test the connections between models, data, identities, and tools. Find exploitable paths in AI-enabled systems, build the controls to limit them, and give defenders the evidence they need.

AI security services

The model is one part.
Test the whole system.

Start with an architecture decision, a deployed workflow, or a control that needs to hold. Scope the work around what your AI can reach and what it is allowed to change.

Engagement 01

Threat modeling

Where does the system place its trust?

Map the path from a user request to retrieved data, model reasoning, delegated identity, and action. Identify the boundaries an attacker could cross.

  • Prompts, retrieval, memory, and tool connections
  • Mission-specific abuse cases and impact
  • Risk ownership and architecture decisions

The handoff

A prioritized threat model with abuse paths, affected boundaries, and control recommendations.

Engagement 02

AI red teaming

Can that trust be turned into an attack?

Test agreed scenarios across the application and its supporting systems. Follow the consequences of a manipulated prompt or tool call beyond the model response.

  • Prompt injection and retrieval manipulation
  • Tool misuse and delegated privilege abuse
  • Guardrail bypass and attack-path validation

The handoff

Reproducible findings, attack evidence, and verification criteria for the controls that need to change.

Engagement 03

Control engineering

What should the system be allowed to do?

Design and validate controls around the actions an AI workflow can take. Enforce permissions in the application and runtime, not only in the prompt.

  • Least-privilege tool and identity policies
  • Runtime isolation and outbound access limits
  • Implementation guidance and retest criteria

The handoff

A hardening plan with enforceable boundaries and tests to check their behavior.

Engagement 04

Detection & response

Can your team see and contain misuse?

Connect prompt, retrieval, and action telemetry to the investigation workflow. Define what to capture, when to escalate, and how to contain the affected capability.

  • Traceable prompt-to-action telemetry
  • AI incident playbooks and escalation triggers
  • Evidence collection and containment workflows

The handoff

Telemetry requirements, response actions, and validation scenarios for the defending team.

Engineering the controls

Put boundaries around the action.

A prompt is not a permission boundary. Controls need to hold at the points where the system reads data, uses an identity, executes code, or reaches another service.

01

Runtime boundaries

Restrict code execution, network access, and tool behavior outside the model. Test what happens when a workflow tries to exceed those limits.

02

Identity & delegation

Separate reasoning from action privileges. Limit delegated credentials by purpose, scope, and lifetime.

03

Models, data & delivery

Check artifact provenance, retrieval trust, and deployment integrity across model, data, and software supply chains.

04

Operational visibility

Preserve the traces needed to connect a request to an action, investigate a violation, and contain affected tools or sessions.

Broader application or infrastructure testing

From our research

Explore the AI risk matrix.

A catalog of attack scenarios, control mappings, and verification references used in our research. These are baseline scenarios—not findings about your organization or a live threat feed.

Risk scenarios
38
Cataloged controls
28
Direct mitigation links
150
Verification tests
20

Research snapshot: . Scores, suggested owners, and residual-risk labels reflect this baseline, not a customer assessment.

Risk matrix explorer

Search the catalog, then open a scenario for its baseline score and framework references.

38 matching scenarios · Showing 6 of 38

PromptCritical

Agent Goal Hijack via Prompt Injection

Scenario ID: prompt-goal-hijack

Baseline score
25
Suggested owner
Platform Eng
Category
Security
Mapped controls
5
Baseline residual risk
med

Framework references

  • OWASP: LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection
  • MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection
ModelCritical

Backdoored Model Artifact in Supply Chain

Scenario ID: model-artifact-supply-chain-backdoor

Baseline score
20
Suggested owner
AppSec
Category
Security
Mapped controls
4
Baseline residual risk
high

Framework references

  • OWASP: LLM03:2025 Supply Chain
  • MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0058 Publish Poisoned Models
Retrieval (RAG)Critical

Credential Harvesting Through Retrieval Content

Scenario ID: rag-credential-harvesting

Baseline score
20
Suggested owner
Data Eng
Category
Security
Mapped controls
4
Baseline residual risk
med

Framework references

  • OWASP: LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0082 RAG Credential Harvesting
ToolsCritical

Cross-System Data Exfiltration via Toolchain

Scenario ID: toolchain-data-exfiltration

Baseline score
20
Suggested owner
SecOps
Category
Privacy
Mapped controls
5
Baseline residual risk
high

Framework references

  • OWASP: LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0086 Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation
MemoryCritical

Cross-Tenant Memory Leakage

Scenario ID: cross-tenant-memory-leakage

Baseline score
20
Suggested owner
Platform Eng
Category
Privacy
Mapped controls
4
Baseline residual risk
med

Framework references

  • OWASP: LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure
  • MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0085 Data from AI Services
IdentityCritical

Delegated Credential Compromise

Scenario ID: delegated-credential-compromise

Baseline score
20
Suggested owner
IT
Category
Security
Mapped controls
5
Baseline residual risk
med

Framework references

  • OWASP: LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency
  • MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0055 Unsecured Credentials
About the research baseline and mappings

The snapshot contains 1,064 risk-control pairs, including direct and adjacent mappings. A mapping is a research relationship, not proof that a control has been implemented or that a risk has been eliminated. Framework references support assessment planning; they do not imply certification or endorsement.

What you receive

Evidence for the next engineering decision.

Deliverables follow the agreed scope. The aim is to make the risk understandable, the fix actionable, and the next test clear.

System and trust-boundary map
The models, data flows, identities, and actions in scope, with the assumptions and dependencies behind the assessment.
Findings and attack evidence
Validated behavior, affected components, reproduction details, and impact in the context of your workflow.
Prioritized control work
Specific changes for engineering and security teams, with owners, dependencies, and implementation considerations.
Verification and remaining risk
Tests to check the changes, agreed retest coverage, and a record of what the assessment did not resolve.

Before we begin

What does your AI have access to?

Tell us what the system does, where it runs, and the actions or data that matter most.

Scope an AI assessment

Keep credentials, sensitive prompts, and production data out of the initial web inquiry.

Active incident? Get response support
Do you test more than the model?

Yes. The assessment can include the application, retrieval pipeline, tools, identities, runtime, and supporting infrastructure. We agree on the relevant components and authorized actions before testing.

Can you assess agentic and retrieval-based systems?

Yes. We examine how an agent delegates work, accesses data, calls tools, and takes actions. For retrieval-augmented generation, testing can include source trust, access boundaries, and how retrieved content influences the workflow.

Is the risk matrix a score for our organization?

No. It is a dated snapshot of our research catalog, not a live assessment of your environment. Risk bands, scores, suggested owners, and residual-risk labels reflect that baseline. An engagement establishes the context and evidence for your system.

Does an assessment certify an AI system as safe?

No. Testing provides evidence within an agreed scope and set of conditions. It cannot establish that every model behavior or future attack has been covered. Findings include assessment limits and remaining risks.

Can you help implement and retest controls?

Yes. Control engineering and validation can be included in the engagement. Implementation responsibilities, access, retest scope, and acceptance criteria are agreed with your team.

What should we share to start?

Describe the workflow, the decisions or actions it supports, and the stage of development. Keep credentials, sensitive prompts, production data, and model artifacts out of the initial web inquiry; we can arrange an appropriate exchange after scoping.